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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 10-4049
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEON BOLDEN,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-02-cr-00045-001)
District Judge: The Honorable Leonard P. Stark
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 26, 2011
BEFORE: FUENTES, FISHER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 22, 2011 )
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

I.

Appellant Deon Bolden, while under an order of supervised release from a prior
federal conviction, was arrested for possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance. Bolden pleaded guilty in state court. At a subsequent revocation hearing in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Bolden admitted violating
the terms of his supervised release.
Bolden’s defense attorney urged the District Court to grant a sentencing variance
for two reasons. First, counsel argued that Bolden was scheduled to serve a state
sentence of eighteen months of intensive probation, a sentencing alternative to
incarceration that requires a minimum of eight hours of weekly supervision and other
conditions that would reintegrate Bolden into society while addressing the issues that led
to his re-offending.
Counsel also argued that Bolden might not be able to avail himself of that
alternative sentencing structure set by the state if he received a federal sentence of
twenty-four months because his state sentence might run concurrent to the federal
sentence. Bolden also raised arguments concerning his need to provide assistance to his
fiancé, whose medical condition arose after his arrest, and the burden incarceration would
place on his young family.
The District Court indicated that it reviewed a letter of support from Mr. Bolden’s
fiancé and likewise considered her medical condition. The impact that Bolden’s
incarceration would have on his family was also considered. The District Court indicated
it considered the Probation Office’s recommendation, the arguments made by Bolden’s
counsel and the Government, as well as Bolden’s personal statement to the Court. The
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District Court sentenced Bolden to twenty-four months imprisonment. Bolden timely
filed a Notice of Appeal. Counsel filed a brief with this Court as well as a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that this appeal
raises no nonfrivolous issues. Bolden did not file a pro se brief. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and will also
affirm the judgment of sentence ordered by the District Court.
II.
Under Anders, a lawyer may “withdraw from a case when the indigent criminal
defendant he represents wishes to pursue frivolous arguments on appeal.” United States v.
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2001). The lawyer must conduct a “conscientious
examination of” the case, and if she determines the “case to be wholly frivolous,” she
must file a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.” Id. (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). Counsel must also explain the faults in
the purportedly frivolous arguments. Id. at 300. If the court, upon independent review of
the record, agrees that the case is wholly frivolous, then it “can grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal under federal law.” Id. at 299.
Here, counsel’s brief identifies one issue – namely the reasonableness of Bolden’s
sentence. We review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness with regard to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States
v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007).
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district court's
sentence upon revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion. See United States
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v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007). Absent procedural error, we will affirm the
sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, the record establishes that the District Court committed no significant
procedural error. It considered Bolden’s arguments as well as the Government’s position
in favor of a within-guidelines sentence. The District Court explained that it was taking
into account the factors set forth in § 3553(a), including among others, the nature and
circumstances of the offense, Bolden’s criminal history, the sentencing range established
for the offense, efforts at rehabilitation, the need to protect the public, evidence of
recidivism, the need to protect the public, the need to promote respect for the law, and the
goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. That is to say, the record establishes that the District
Court followed the proper procedures. We, therefore, cannot say that no reasonable
sentencing court would have imposed this sentence in this case. See, e.g., United States
v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010).
III.
We find that counsel here has adequately shown that there are no nonfrivolous
appealable issues for review. Furthermore, our independent review of the record reveals
that there are no appealable issues of merit. Therefore, Counsel’s motion for leave to
withdraw is granted and the District Court’s finding that Bolden violated the terms of his
supervised release and the court’s subsequent sentence will be affirmed. In addition, we
certify that the issues presented lack legal merit and that counsel is not required to file a
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petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. See Third
Circuit Local Rule 109.2(b).
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